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Summary
Since the 1990s, the notion of social recognition has developed 
into a key concept for sociological theory. Recognition theory 
seems especially promising as a means of understanding 
intercultural conflicts, as the sociology of intercultural relations 
often addresses claims of recognition of a specific identity that 
is different from that of the main society. 
The aim of this article is to show that recognition theory 
can be used as a key concept in examining group inclusion 
in multicultural societies. Nevertheless, the existing theoretical 
approaches to recognition are insufficient for that purpose. 
Therefore, I develop my own approach to the recognition of 
minority groups as second-order recognition. 
The concept of second-order recognition helps analyzing, 
understanding and evaluating conflicts in multicultural societies. 
It allows conflicts within groups that involve a struggle for first-
order recognition to be distinguished from conflicts between 
cultural minorities and the main society that involve a struggle 
for second-order recognition.
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reSumen
Desde los años 90, la noción de reconocimiento social se ha 
convertido en un concepto clave para la teoría sociológica. La 
teoría del reconocimiento parece especialmente prometedora 
para entender conflictos interculturales puesto que la sociolo-
gía de las relaciones interculturales a menudo aborda reivindi-
caciones de reconocimiento de identidades particulares, dife-
rentes de las del resto de la sociedad.
El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar que la teoría del re-
conocimiento puede ser utilizada como concepto clave para 
analizar la inclusión de grupos en sociedades multiculturales. 
No obstante, los enfoques teóricos existentes son insuficientes 
para este cometido. Por ello desarrollaré mi propio enfoque de 
reconocimiento de grupos minoritarios como reconocimiento de 
segundo-orden.
El concepto de reconocimiento de segundo orden ayu-
da a analizar, entender y evaluar conflictos en sociedades 
multiculturales. Permite diferenciar entre conflictos dentro de 
grupos (reconocimiento de primer orden) y conflictos entre 
minorías culturales y el resto de la sociedad, como luchas de 
reconocimiento de segundo orden.
PalabraS Clave
Axel Honneth; Conflictos sociales; Multiculturalismo; Recono-
cimiento. 
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Since the 1990s, the notion of social recognition has 
developed into a key concept for social and sociological 
theory (Fraser 2003; Honneth 1992; Ricoeur 2005; Taylor 
1994). This concept suggests that individuals create, 
shape, and confirm their identity as autonomous subjects 
in interactions with other persons and institutions. It is 
therefore a matter of vital interests, justice, and social liberty 
(Honneth 2011) to create social and institutional settings 
that allow individuals to find themselves recognized. Unlike 
some classical liberal theories that start with individuals 
and then address the question of how these individuals 
could best organize their mode of living, recognition 
theory is grounded in real, existing social interactions 
and demands for recognition. Unlike the utopian views 
of those who argue for justice without taking into account 
the pre-existing, intuitive ideas about justice that are 
dominant in a given society, recognition theory is more 
likely to be accepted by society because it is grounded in 
pre-existing intuitions of justice. Moreover, its reference to 
intersubjectivity and the analysis of pre-existing institutions 
makes recognition a genuine sociological concept, as 
it is now possible to analyze social reality in terms of 
whether it offers individuals the opportunity to develop an 
autonomous, recognized personality.
A good definition of recognition for our purpose was 
brought into debate by Ikähimo (2002) and aims to differ-
entiate recognition as a term for social and political philoso-
phy from the everyday notion of recognition as apprehen-
sion or simply respect. Although there are, of course, differ-
ences in the use of the recognition concept, we could take 
this definition as a good starting point. Following Ikäheimo, 
recognition is “a case of A taking B as C in the dimension of 
D, and B taking A as a relevant judge” (450). Here, several 
aspects could be underlined:
1. Recognition as a term referring to persons, that is hu-
man beings with specific characteristics which could 
be granted (recognized) or not. In this sense, when we 
recognize, for example, someone’s right to express his 
opinion, we recognize the human being as a person 
with that right.
2. Recognition is a notion of social interaction in a double 
sense:
a) A person cannot be recognized only by itself, there 
has to be at least one person or institution which 
has to recognize the other.
b) The recognizing institution/person has to be in a 
certain sense recognized by the other as able to 
provide true recognition.
Although recognition theory in all of its dominant vari-
ants aims at individuals involved in processes of mutual 
recognition (see also zurn 2003), the theory of recognition 
“always presupposes a horizon of collectivity” (Heins 2010: 
161). Struggles for recognition therefore are always strug-
gles for a community and for inclusion. Furthermore, there 
are some aspects of recognition theory that make it espe-
cially promising in terms of processes of group inclusion. 
Recognition theory can serve as a means of understand-
ing intercultural conflicts, as the sociology of intercultural 
relations often addresses claims of recognition of a spe-
cific identity that is different from that of the main society. 
In looking closely at that “politics of identity”, we can see 
that this term covers a broad spectrum of legal, economic, 
personal or collective recognition that directly affects an 
individual’s relation-to-self: his or her self-confidence, self-
respect and self-esteem. Recognition here seems to be a 
promising concept for multiculturalism, as it is able to com-
bine equality and difference, similarity and distinction. We 
are all equal in that we all need love/friendship, rights/re-
spect and esteem. We are also all equal because we need 
these forms of recognition to create our own autonomy and 
our own successful relationship to ourselves through self-
confidence, self-respect and self-esteem. Simultaneously, 
we are also different: we have different primary relation-
ships, sometimes we have differentiated rights, and es-
teem is granted on the basis of individual merit. As van den 
Brink and owen (2007) state:
In relations of recognition, subjects reassure others and them-
selves of their similarity with regard to their being persons who all 
have similar needs, capacities, and abilities, which can only be sus-
tained and further developed through intersubjective relations. At 
the same time, these dependent and in important respects, similar 
persons reassure themselves and others of their status as distinct 
individuals. (p. 4) 
Nevertheless, due to the direct link between recogni-
tion theory and personal identity and individual autonomy, 
recognition theory has seldom been used successfully 
to understand the recognition of groups. Although Taylor 
prominently addresses the problem of multicultural recog-
nition in his famous article (Taylor 1994), the broader and 
more explicit notion of recognition by Axel Honneth has not 
yet been used for cases of group recognition. In only one 
article (Honneth 2001) and one interview (Honneth 2006) 
does Honneth talk directly about aspects of multicultural 
recognition. What is more, in his dispute with Nancy Fraser, 
Honneth discusses the problem of recognizing specific cul-
tural identities denying the possibility of a fourth principle 
of recognition by understanding group claims ultimately as 
the claims of its members, not grasping the sociological 
complexity of groups as social actors (Honneth in Fraser 
and Honneth 2003: 161-170).
The aim of this article is to show that recognition theory 
can be used as a key concept in examining sociological phe-
nomena linked to questions of group inclusion. Nevertheless, 
the existing theoretical approaches to recognition are insuf-
ficient for that purpose. Therefore, I develop my own ap-
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proach to the recognition of minority groups as second-order 
recognition, which combined with Axel Honneth’s broader 
notion of recognition, facilitates the understanding of group 
recognition. The notion of second-order recognition as it is 
presented here can be used to better analyze intercultural 
relations. Moreover, this notion can be used to normatively 
evaluate inter-group relations as practices of second-order 
recognition. on this basis, Honneth’s recognition theory be-
comes applicable to processes of group recognition.
In the first section, I will show how the concept of recog-
nition has developed over time and how it can be used to 
understand the processes involved in intercultural relations 
(I). Using common criticisms of the applicability of the rec-
ognition concept for multicultural purposes, I will suggest 
a view of second-order recognition that will aid us in un-
derstanding the recognition of cultural groups (section II). I 
will then analytically develop the concept of second-order 
recognition and relate it to the different forms of (first-order) 
recognition described by Honneth so that it can be used as 
a tool for sociological analysis (section III). 
The ConCePT of reCogniTion
Diverging from theories that were influenced by Descartes’ 
philosophy that knowledge of the self is achieved through 
introspection, Hegel is usually identified as the philosopher 
who introduced the concept of recognition as a dialogical 
model of self-knowledge (McQueen 2012). Social psychol-
ogists such as Herbert Mead (1962) used the dialogical 
model to show that personal identity is not something origi-
nal or internal but the result of a dialogical process. 
When Charles Taylor explored the topic of recognition 
in his famous article Multiculturalism and the Politics of 
Recognition (Taylor 1994), he explicitly mentioned Mead as 
well as Hegel and the idea that “our identity is partly shaped 
by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition 
of others.” Significantly, he insists on the “real” or material 
aspect of this identity: “And so, a person or group of people 
can suffer real damage, real distortion if the people or society 
around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning 
or contemptible picture of themselves.” (p. 25) Therefore, for 
Taylor, recognition is “a vital human need” (p. 26). Here, it is 
clear that misrecognition ought to be viewed as an important 
social problem because it damages one’s relation-to-self.
I view Taylor’s approach as narrow because he concen-
trates only on one sphere and two modes of recognition. 
Taylor states that there are two spheres of recognition: the 
“intimate sphere” and the “public sphere” (p. 37). Although 
he recognizes that “[c]ertain feminist theories have tried to 
show the links between the two spheres” (ibid.), he only 
concentrates on the public sphere as the space for the poli-
tics of equal recognition. However, when talking about the 
“politics of recognition”, Taylor should be aware that there 
are very important framework decisions to be made about 
how the state or society shapes the conditions for the pri-
vate sphere. Contemporary debates center on questions 
such as the following. To what degree should the state be 
able to intervene in the decisions of parents to educate 
their children (e.g., religious fanatics who want to raise their 
children apart from or against society)? What type of inti-
mate spheres should be protected (as in the debates about 
homosexual marriages and adoption rights)? To what de-
gree should society positively intervene in families through 
welfare politics (e.g., by providing housing benefits or ben-
efits for large families)? In addition, even if there were no 
link between the private and the public spheres, the private 
sphere as a space in which humans first receive recogni-
tion cannot be underestimated for sociological analysis. In 
other words, we can see how the narrowness of the notion 
of recognition in Taylor is a result of his exclusion of the 
private sphere. The roots of this strong division between 
public and private exist in the liberal tradition, in which the 
private is observed as providing freedom from social and 
governmental interference. However, for sociological pur-
poses, this limitation is quite unsustainable.
I also view Taylor’s version as narrow because he con-
centrates only on two modes of recognition. The first mode, 
which can also be understood as a result of Taylor’s liberal 
tradition, is universalism and equality: the equalization of 
rights and entitlements. Although there is significant debate 
on how far-reaching equality should be and which types of 
natural or social inequalities should be compensated for, 
the idea of equal citizenship in principle is widely accepted. 
In contrast to or jointly with this equal recognition, Taylor 
imagines a second mode in which “[e]veryone should be 
recognized for his or her unique identity” (p. 38). This de-
mand for recognition in the “politics of difference” based on 
identities or statuses that are not universally shared, seems 
to contradict the first mode of recognition. The demand is 
not that people recognize one’s universal potential to create 
one’s own identity but that they recognize the content of this 
identity as valuable. This demand is often formulated within 
multicultural contexts and often conflicts with the demand 
for equality, which is understood as the “sameness” of rights 
and treatment. The second mode is connected with the first 
mode in that all people are equal (the first mode) due to the 
mere existence of their unique or differentiated identities (the 
second mode). Finally, Taylor argues in favor of recognition 
under the presumption that cultures “that have animated 
whole societies over some considerable stretch of time” 
have an important contribution to make to the rest of society. 
This presumption, which would lead to a dialogue between 
cultures and finally to a “merging of horizons”, grounds rec-
ognition in a plausible supposed potential.
Axel Honneth, who published his book The Struggle for 
Recognition (1992) almost at the same time, seems to use 
the same sources as Taylor, especially Hegel and Mead; 
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he dedicates a whole chapter to the latter. However, unlike 
Taylor, Honneth does not use the Phenomenology of Spirit as 
his main text; rather, he uses Hegel’s Jena Phenomenology 
and later also the Philosophy of Rights (Honneth 2000, 2011). 
From these writings, Honneth draws his three spheres and 
three modes of recognition. I will therefore refer to his con-
cept of recognition as the broad approach.
Following Hegel, in the family, individuals are recog-
nized as having concrete needs in the mode of love. In 
civil society, the formal autonomy of persons is recognized 
by their rights, and in the state, affective intuition about the 
family and the cognitive concept of rights are somehow 
sublated (aufgehoben)2 in intellectual intuition (or the “af-
fect made rational”) in the third sphere: the state. Here, the 
mode of recognition is solidarity between subjects with spe-
cific individuality (see also Hernàndez and Herzog 2011; 
Pippin 2007). However, unlike Hegel, Honneth does not 
see these three spheres as partaking in a process in which 
one sphere leads to the creation of another, which finally 
comes to an end with the (Prussian) state. For Honneth, in 
modern societies there are three parallel and interwoven 
spheres with three equally important modes of recognition.
What is important for Honneth is that every sphere 
corresponds to one specific dimension of personality and 
practical self-relation. For successful self-relation, one has 
to experience recognition in all three spheres. otherwise, 
one component of one’s personality is threatened. Honneth 
summarizes his approach as shown in Table 1 (Honneth 
1992: 129 – slightly expanded):
Here, we can observe the three spheres of recognition 
and how each of these spheres corresponds to different 
modes of recognition: emotional support, cognitive respect 
and social esteem. Each of these modes in our society is 
linked to a specific form of recognition. This is why most au-
thors such as Thomson (2006) do not differentiate between 
modes and forms and instead speak directly of the following 
three modes: love, respect, and esteem. As we can see, for 
2  For information regarding the complex meaning and 
translation of aufheben and Aufhebung see Froeb (2012).
Honneth, there is a developmental potential in the different 
modes of recognition, which is one reason why the process 
or the “struggle” for recognition has not yet come to an end: 
love in families can be liberated from economic pressures 
(Honneth in Fraser and Honneth 2003: 139), and rights can 
be generalized or esteem can be distributed in a more indi-
vidualized way. What is important is that all of these modes 
refer to specific dimensions of personality and that if one part 
of a person’s personality is disrespected, that disrespect can 
lead not only to social disintegration but also to serious dam-
age to one’s self-relation.
Regarding the idea of multicultural recognition, Honneth’s 
proposal suggests the potential to combine equality (equal 
rights) and differentiated recognition in the form of social 
esteem based on merit. However, Honneth’s approach to 
diversity and particular identities seems quite different from 
Taylor’s. Unlike Taylor, for whom differentiated recognition 
refers to the already existing content of identities, Honneth 
suggests the existence of socially shared knowledge as well 
as a struggle about what should count as individual merit. 
What is recognized by Honneth is not identity but merit, al-
though some types of merit can have important consequenc-
es for identity construction. However, this conceptualization 
clearly excludes some forms of identities (e.g., “race”, sexual 
identity) that cannot be freely chosen and therefore should 
not be considered to generate social esteem. 
ProblemS of mulTiCulTural reCogniTion and The 
ConCePT of SeCond-order reCogniTion
In order to develop a concept of recognition which could be 
used for the inclusion of groups, I will discuss some prob-
lems linked to the application of the model of recognition 
towards social groups. The critics are ultimately linked to 
the risk of reification of the sources of recognition. Instead 
of proposing an original point of the sources of recognition, 
I will try to integrate these sources of recognition with my 
concept of second-order recognition which either resolves 
or avoids the problems discussed.
Table 1. 
Honneth’s Theory of Recognition
sphere of recognition Family State Society
mode of recognition Emotional support Cognitive respect Social esteem
Dimension of personality Needs and emotions Moral responsibility Traits and abilities
Forms of recognition Primary relationships (love, friendship) Legal relation (rights) Community of value (solidarity)
Developmental potential e.g., Freedom from economic restrictions generalization, de-formalization Individualization, equalization
Practical relation-to-self Basic self-confidence Self-respect Self-esteem
Forms of disrespect Abuse and rape Denial of rights, exclusion Denigration, insult
threatened component of personality Physical integrity Social integrity ‘Honor’, dignity
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1) Resolving the problem of the source of recognition
When applying the concept of recognition towards groups, 
there is the danger of understanding the (potential) value 
of a specific contribution, as somehow original, pre-existing 
or created by the cultural group itself without further con-
tact with the rest of the society. This would suggest some 
form of consensus within the community about the charac-
ter of the community (Sánchez-Dura 2007) and the idea 
of authenticity of that specific group. McQueen (2012), fol-
lowing Laitinen (2002) and Markell (2007), calls this model 
the responsive model. Whereas in the generation model, 
the focus is on what identities are produced through rec-
ognition and how this occurs, the responsive model advo-
cates acknowledging someone “as they already really are” 
(Appiah 1994: 149). This model could lead to a reification 
of the group as if it were a static entity. Not only is this 
conceptualization faulty because groups constantly create, 
develop, and change their identities, but it can also lead 
to the coercion of the members of a community, who are 
convinced to behave in a real, authentic or proper way. As 
Appiah notes, this type of structure would only replace “one 
kind of tyranny with another” (Appiah 1994: 163). 
Members of a group develop their practices, beliefs, and 
habits through a process of socialization in which recogni-
tion itself is essential. Recognition is vital to the creation of 
one’s identity, not only in contact with the rest of society but 
also within the group itself. Therefore, a person needs such 
recognition to develop a comfortable identity as a member 
of the group. In other words, what is to be recognized by 
the rest of society is itself the result of an (internal) process 
of recognition. We can therefore speak of the recognition 
of cultural minorities by the main society as second-order 
recognition. The main society will then recognize specific 
practices or patterns in how minority groups organize rec-
ognition. For example, we could recognize the specific type 
of love and care that African women in western societies 
give to their children even though they often have a heavy 
workload inside and outside their families. In this specific 
form of recognition, the recognizer does not indicate a de-
sire to adopt that family model for himself/herself; he or 
she simply expresses respect for a specific solution to the 
more general problem of raising children. Thus, second-
order recognition is not a doubling of recognition; we do 
not share the specific love or commitment of the other but 
instead simply recognize it as valuable.
Another example of second-order recognition is the rec-
ognition of how members of a religious group grant equal 
respect to each other based on the idea that before god, 
we are all equal. We do not have to share that religious 
conviction to recognize the specific practice of upholding 
equality as valuable. We can understand the importance 
of equality for the members of the group and recognize the 
specific solution that the religious group has found to the 
problem of equality. In the same way, we could recognize 
how individuals in the group are esteemed based on their 
individual contribution without sharing this esteem for the 
contribution.
one argument against this approach to second-order 
recognition is that with this concept, we are again aban-
doning the dialogical model. The main society recognizes 
something (second-order recognition) that already exists, 
although this time, the existing characteristic is the product 
of a process of first-order recognition. However, when col-
lective claims for recognition are made towards the main 
society and its institutions, particular groups and main 
society are again engaging in dialogue. What is more, at 
the moment a particular group makes a claim towards the 
main society, it is implicitly recognizing the main society as 
a competent dialogue partner.
The so produced second-order recognition is the basis 
upon which first-order recognition takes place. Second-
order recognition is the framework that is required in this 
society for groups to successfully build their own identities. 
For first-order recognition to be effective, a specific mate-
rial, ideological, or juridical infrastructure is required. This 
infrastructure, which allows the cultural group to organize 
recognition according to its own rules, can be interpreted 
as a form of – dialogically constructed – recognition of the 
minority group. For a group to organize recognition, the 
broader society has to protect specific rights such as re-
ligious freedom or material infrastructure, for example, by 
providing meeting places for the community. 
2) avoiding the problem of the limits of the group
The second problem is closely linked to the idea of group 
characteristics as authentic. It is unclear how we can iden-
tify those cultures or groups who will be the object of rec-
ognition. Taylor, for example, refers to cultures “that have 
animated whole societies over some considerable stretch 
of time” as candidates for group recognition. Here it seems 
that this approach views “cultures” as an authentic and 
more or less invariant group. But as seen in the previous 
examples, we were not recognizing a whole group or cul-
ture; we were only recognizing a specific, concrete practice. 
of course, we know that specific practices are embedded 
in particular cultural contexts, but in the same way that cul-
tures change over time, their practices change over time, 
and we could approach every single practice of a culture 
with Taylor’s presumption that that practice is an important 
contribution (i.e., an important form of recognition).
one example of such a specific practice is bullfighting, 
which is part of the Spanish tradition in most regions of 
Spain and some regions of Latin America. This practice 
is viewed by most western observers as cruel to animals 
and is therefore rejected. Nevertheless, we could view this 
practice with the presumption that it makes an important 
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contribution and ask what the practice offers to bullfighters 
and spectators in terms of recognition. We can easily see 
the specific recognition of the bullfighter due to his physical 
capacities and bravery; in addition, the spectators recog-
nize their common identity, which also connects them with 
a specific cultural tradition. These aspects of the experience 
are all positive for the people involved, although we may not 
share bravery as an ideal or as a basis for recognition, or we 
may even think that bullfighting is not brave at all but rather 
is foolish or cowardly. In other words, without recognizing 
the legitimacy of the practices themselves, we can develop 
a type of second-order recognition not of the practice itself 
but rather of other individuals’ recognition of it. 
Now, we can ask whether our ‘recognition of recogni-
tion’ based on physical capacities and bravery really re-
quires the practice of killing bulls. other forms of public 
spectacle could be imagined that would provide the posi-
tive aspects of the bullfight without the negative ones. I am 
thinking here of the tradition that arose in response to the 
criticisms of bullfights in the south of France. In this tradi-
tion, instead of hurting and killing a bull, people try to fool 
the animal by jumping over it and “playing” with the bull. 
In this somehow sublated form of bullfighting, recognition 
for the “bullfighter” is still based on physical capacities and 
bravery, and the spectators still feel the common identity 
connected to the long tradition of bullfighting. Second-
order recognition by the rest of society can foster this type 
of cultural practice and therefore allow the specific group 
that practices it to seek cultural group recognition.
This example also shows that we do not recognize (or re-
fuse to recognize) a cultural group as whole. We do not have 
to develop a judgment, whether final or provisional, about 
the whole culture. We do not even have to share the same 
beliefs based upon which specific recognition is distributed 
by a cultural group. Instead, we can pick out a specific (rec-
ognition) practice and evaluate the practice directly in terms 
of the concept of recognition and its other qualities. This pro-
cess makes it easier to avoid the reification of entire groups.
3) avoiding the problem of valuing groups as a whole
The proposal of second-order recognition also solves a 
third problem: common approaches to multicultural recog-
nition are based on the presumption that relatively stable 
cultural groups have some important contribution to make. 
At least since Foucault (see, for example, Foucault 1994, 
1995, 2010), we have been able to reverse that presump-
tion and discuss the possibility that in every culture or so-
ciety, there are power relations and oppression that run 
contrary to liberty but that guarantee stability over time. By 
not examining groups as a whole but instead considering 
concrete practices, we can disentangle different aspects 
of cultures. Just as we differentiated between positive and 
negative aspects of the bullfight, we can partially recognize 
or reject practices without judging the whole group posi-
tively or negatively.
4) Resolving the problem of detecting the content
These thoughts are linked to the fourth problem: the prob-
lem of approaching a whole culture as having some im-
portant contribution to make. If we directly consider the 
concrete contribution of a specific practice, then it is far 
easier to determine exactly what we value. This approach 
helps us to protect a specific part of the culture. Thus, we 
can directly value practices, persons who behave in a spe-
cific way, and groups that foster this behavior without as-
suming a positive stance towards the group as whole. This 
approach also makes it easier to reject specific practices 
without rejecting a group as a whole and therefore without 
disregarding the group or the individuals in that group.
The proposal made here still includes the presumption 
of an important contribution, as in the example of the bull-
fight. Instead of rejecting a specific practice due to its cru-
elty to animals, I began by considering the recognition ben-
efits of that practice for the persons involved. I began with 
the (potentially counterintuitive) presumption that there is 
something valuable in a practice that involves hurting and 
killing animals as part of a public spectacle. The example 
showed that it is possible to analytically separate positive 
qualities from negative, rejected ones.
In conclusion, second-order recognition and first-order 
recognition allow us to identify specific practices among 
individual cultural groups as important to the identities 
and the self-images of the members of a specific group. 
It enables us to understand specific practices as part of 
the recognition of that group. Second-order recognition is a 
means of considering first-order recognition. It allows us to 
positively evaluate a recognition practice or a whole recog-
nition framework without having to agree with the valuation 
of the practice itself.
We can now define second-order recognition with refer-
ence to the general definition of recognition by Ikäheimo 
(2002) and Margalit (2001): Second-order recognition is a 
case in which A (person, group or institution) correctly iden-
tifies the recognitional content of a practice P by a Group 
B, seeing it in a potentially public, intersubjective, and un-
derstandable act, as a practice that recognizes C in the 
dimension of D, with B taking A as a legitimate authority.
Here, several aspects could be underlined:
3. Second-order recognition is a term that does not refer 
directly to persons and groups. In a first instance it re-
fers to practices (of groups and persons) which could 
be valued (recognized) or not. In this sense, when we 
recognize, for example, a culture that organizes bull-
fights, we are only referring positively to the recognitio-
nal content of that practice.
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4. Second-order recognition is a notion of social interac-
tion in a triple sense:
c) The practice itself involves (first order) recognition 
within the group, i.e., a dialogical way of distributing 
emotional support, cognitive respect, or social esteem.
d) A practice of a minority group often cannot be re-
cognized only by the group. There has to someti-
mes be a larger group or an institution which has to 
recognize the practice in case the practice needs 
some specific protection.
e) The recognizing institution/group has to be in a cer-
tain sense recognized by the other as able to provi-
de true recognition. This is usually the case as mi-
nority groups make claims for recognition towards 
the main society. Nevertheless, there are also some 
cases of extreme isolation; for example,  religious 
groups that do not want any contact at all with the 
rest of the society. In the latter case we could not 
speak of second-order recognition.
We have observed that second-order recognition permits 
us to recognize diverse practices even if we do not admire 
those practices. This idea may sound paradoxical, but what 
we recognize is the recognitional content of the practice rath-
er than the practice itself. Second-order recognition can be 
used to help us to positively relate to negative or false prac-
tices in a manner that is similar to the concept of tolerance 
that is discussed by Forst (2010). Forst criticizes one version 
of the concept of tolerance using goethe’s statement “to tol-
erate means to insult”, arguing that toleration often means a 
certain paternalism towards the tolerated subject and there-
fore creates a hierarchical power structure. As an alternative 
to this concept, he presents his own approach to tolerance, 
which includes objection, acceptance and rejection:
First, a tolerated belief or practice has to be judged as false or 
bad to be a candidate for toleration; second […] there have to be 
reasons why it would still be wrong not no tolerate these false or 
bad beliefs or practices – that is, reasons of acceptance. […] And 
third, there have to be reasons for rejection that mark the limits of 
toleration. (p. 216f)
Based on this logic, a recognized belief or practice can 
be judged as false or negative. Nevertheless, we can often 
accept the recognitional content or structure linked with 
this practice. Finally, we can also reject other aspects of 
the practice, carefully balancing the negative aspects of 
the practice with the positive ones. 
This conceptualization of recognition allows us to avoid 
reification in two ways. First, we understand the specific 
cultural practice as a result of and as embedded in the rec-
ognition order3 for that cultural group. The practice or its 
3  Regarding the idea of society as recognition order see McNay (2005).
evaluation by the group is constantly being recreated and 
therefore can change. Second, we understand first-order 
recognition itself as a process of recognition that creates, 
shapes, solidifies. or changes the basis for the practice 
in question and the opportunity for the group to organize 
intra-group recognition. In the next section, we will see how 
this new approach to recognition becomes clearer when 
combined with the broad notion of recognition presented 
by Axel Honneth. 
SeCond-order reCogniTion aS an analyTiCal Tool
As we have observed, second-order recognition is the rec-
ognition of a specific way in which a group organizes rec-
ognition internally. The possible solutions to the problems 
noted in the last section justify a more in-depth analysis of 
the concept of second-order recognition. Some questions 
must be addressed if we hope to better understand the 
benefits that the concept can provide and the limits of the 
concept. Up until now, I have argued in a quite unspecific 
way about the “recognition” of “recognition”. However, as 
we have observed, Honneth provides a very rich concep-
tual vocabulary that can be used to identify the different 
dimensions of recognition. In what follows, I will try to apply 
the three dimensions of recognition that are presented by 
Honneth (in what I called the broad notion of recognition) 
to the concept of second-order recognition. I will therefore 
apply the three modes of recognition to both first-order and 
second-order recognition.
A cultural minority often has a specific way of organiz-
ing recognition among its members. First, there are differ-
ent forms of organizing emotional support among families, 
friends, peers, tribes, and other groups. As far as we know, 
all cultural groups need and grant love and friendship in 
some way. Second, some cultures have their own rules that 
are at least similar to legal relationships and that provide 
cognitive respect. In most cases, this cognitive respect is 
not tantamount to legal rights as we understand them, but 
nevertheless, it is at least a limited form of self-organization 
that is similar to rights. Third, cultural groups usually have 
a group-specific way of recognizing the individual contribu-
tions of its members, that is, of granting social esteem in a 
solidary community of values.
Members and institutions within the main society are 
also able to provide emotional support, cognitive respect, 
and social esteem. However, a question remains: is it pos-
sible to recognize all three modes of first-order recogni-
tion in all three modes of second-order recognition? What 
would the features of this structure be? Below, I will discuss 
and illustrate the possible combinations and answer the 
question of who is the recognizer or the recognized individ-
ual in each case. Theoretically, the following nine modes of 
second-order recognition should be possible (see Table 2): 
RIS  [online] 2015, 73 (2), e008. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/ris.2013.07.21
8  . BENNo HERzog 
Table 2.
Possible modes of second-order recognition
second-order recognition
Emotional support Cognitive respect Social esteem
First-order emotional support A1 B1 C1
First-order cognitive respect A2 B2 C2
First-order social esteem A3 B3 C3
make provisions for financial aid when one is caring for 
dependent family members as well as time resources 
such as the right to parental leave or specific legal rights 
for individuals in relation to their direct family members. 
For instance, they might be granted special rights such 
as the right to make decisions for underage or incapaci-
tated family members or the right to care for them even 
after one’s own death through terms specified in a will. 
Second-order recognition in this case could mean the le-
gal recognition of traditionally or culturally differentiated 
forms of loving and caring through privileges for individu-
als who are involved in the caring process. one example 
would be the extension of the previously mentioned legal 
rights to individuals from the broader community in those 
cultural groups, in which primary emotional support is 
given by the whole community.
Whereas in this case, those who receive special rights 
are individual members of cultural groups, it is also pos-
sible to think about larger units as holders of rights. For 
instance, in tax policies, the family unit or the people living 
together under one roof are often considered together. It 
might make sense to extend the notion of a primary unit to 
a larger community whenever the culturally specific notion 
of living, caring, or loving seems to apply to a larger com-
munity than the western model of the nuclear family.
In summary, multicultural second-order recognition re-
quires a broadened and adapted legal framework for emo-
tional support in accordance with the practices of specific 
cultural groups. The main society is not obligated to value 
the specific way of providing love and care that is exercised 
in the cultural minority group, but the society must recog-
nize that method as a possible solution to the problem of 
emotional support.
B2) The case of legal support by legal or quasi-legal 
structures in cultural groups is somewhat more complicated. 
Second-order recognition in this case could mean the legal 
recognition of culturally specific or traditional ways of ad-
dressing community issues based on a group’s own legal 
rules. This is the question of the right to self-government, 
about which there has been significant public debate. Issues 
such as the “cultural right” to perform genital mutilation, 
obligatory prayer, or mass attendance for members of re-
ligious groups, and the right to organize public services in 
a) Emotional support always requires a person-to-
person relationship. Although people can be pleased with 
laws or societies, they can only love (even in a broad 
sense) persons. Thus, it is not possible to love recogni-
tion practices or frameworks, whether they are associated 
with one’s own cultural group or another cultural minority 
group. In addition, nobody can or should be forced to love 
any other person. of course, acts that usually result from 
emotional bonding, such as mutual care or financial aid 
within families, can be forced upon individuals; however, 
these acts are not the same as love. Consider, for exam-
ple, a person who is obligated to pay alimony to his ex-
partner but does not love her and does not provide her with 
emotional support. Even in cases where there is a strong 
normative imperative, as there is regarding emotional sup-
port for dependent family members, it is impossible to re-
quire a person to love another person. If this is true about 
love towards persons, then it is also true a fortiori about 
love towards recognition structures. Moreover, recognition 
practices or structures, independently of whether they are 
related to emotional support, cognitive respect, or social 
esteem, do not require emotional support. So, for example, 
an internal rule of a minority group perhaps does require 
different types of support from the rest of the society as we 
will see in the next paragraphs, but does not need to be 
emotionally supported by the main society.
B) Although the model of second-order recognition 
seems not to hold for love as the second-order recognition 
of any first-order recognition practice, the same is not true 
of respect as a mode of second-order recognition. Here, 
in all cases, the recognizer is a superior legal organiza-
tion (typically the state) that grants rights. Nevertheless, 
the recognized can be practices of individuals, groups or 
community institutions, as we will see when we examine 
the concept of second-order recognition:
B1) organizations that grant emotional support (typi-
cally families but also friends, tribes, etc.) often seem to 
need a legal framework in order to protect themselves 
against external impositions. To love and care autono-
mously for other persons requires some external resourc-
es. Thus, states usually have family codes that provide 
the foundation for emotional support. These codes often 
RECogNITIoN IN MUlTICUlTURAl SoCIETIES . 9
RIS  [online] 2015, 73 (2), e008. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/ris.2013.07.21
languages different from the language of the main society 
are all relevant to this topic. If we allow group-differentiated 
rights, then we face the problem of differentiating “bad” mi-
nority rights from “good” ones (Kymilicka 1995, 2002). on 
the one hand, Kymlicka differentiates between “internal re-
strictions”, which are those rights that allow the community to 
restrict the individual privileges of its members; for example, 
the obligation to wear certain clothes or to not choose one’s 
own partner. on the other hand, Kymlicka identifies rights 
that provide protection against external pressure. Those 
rights do not limit individual rights but instead supplement 
them. They are usually intended to counter unfairness be-
tween groups. Language rights are one example of this type 
of rights; they protect a linguistic minority from being margin-
alized for linguistic reasons in the public sphere.
It is not difficult to imagine Kymlicka’s response to the 
question of minority rights. He states, “given the commit-
ment to individual autonomy I believe that liberals should 
be skeptical of claims to internal restriction” (Kymlicka 
2002: 342). Furthermore, “minority rights are consistent 
with liberal culturalism if (a) they protect the freedom of 
individual within the group; and (b) they promote relation of 
equality (non-dominance) between groups” (ibid).
In this sense, second-order recognition could mean 
limited legal recognition of community-based regulations. 
only those regulations that do not restrict fundamental 
individual freedoms could be recognized. In practice, 
however, minority groups are often quite skeptical of 
this solution because it seems to create the need for a 
Supreme Court based within the main society that is able 
to rule over the legality of the regulations of the minority 
group. The long history of repression and cultural misun-
derstanding has shown that mainstream society and its 
legal representatives are often far from being neutral in 
evaluating the practices of cultural minorities. one solu-
tion here could be to establish international courts that 
function as arbiters for such cases and make decisions 
based on human rights.
B3) The idea of second-order recognition as cognitive 
respect for specific cultural patterns of organizing esteem 
seems less complicated. This type of second-order recog-
nition legally protects culturally differentiated ways of rec-
ognizing an individual’s contribution to the other members 
of a group. This form of second-order recognition is quite 
uncomplicated because both the main society and the mi-
nority groups recognize their members based on individual 
merit. In the main society, there are different ideas about 
what should count as merit and how it should be recog-
nized. Questions that are discussed in western societies 
include the following. What is the worth of domestic work 
in one’s own household, and should this work be recog-
nized using financial compensation? Should graduates 
from a lower-class background be favored in selection pro-
cesses because it is more impressive for a person to have 
graduated from school while living in a disadvantageous 
economic and cultural context? These examples of de-
bates within mainstream society indicate the extent of the 
disagreement. It is uncontested that merit should be recog-
nized, but what counts as merit is highly disputed. only a 
truly ignorant individual would simply disregard other ways 
of conceptualizing merit.
In this context, it is irrelevant whether the cultural 
group recognizes the merits of hard work, complex work 
or household work; being intelligent, brave or funny; hav-
ing lots of children; being artistic; or living a life devoted to 
other humans, to god or to the nation. The important issue 
here is that every group needs to institutionalize a system 
for granting esteem based on merit. This institutionalization 
process can be considered just when every member has 
the opportunity to participate in practices that are viewed 
as valuable in the community of value.
Second-order recognition here would mean that the 
legal institutions of the main society allow and protect 
alternative means of distributing social esteem based on 
respect. For example, if a social group decides that hav-
ing many children or dedicating significant time to them by 
raising them on their own counts as merit, then this group 
should have the right to redistribute its resources to favor 
people who have more children or who dedicate more time 
to them. Again, the concept of second-order recognition 
also has limits. In this case, a way of distributing social 
esteem that disrespects community members based on 
characteristics that cannot be viewed as individual merits 
(for example, skin color) would not be tolerated.
c) As previously mentioned, social esteem is based on 
merit. For Honneth, social esteem can be symbolic as well 
as material. (This is one of the main differences between 
Honneth and authors like Nancy Fraser, who understand 
recognition in terms of the politics of identity as symbolic 
politics and therefore demand a politics of redistribution). 
A reliable worker can receive a simple “well done” from his 
superiors or colleagues, he can be made employee of the 
month, he can ascend in the hierarchy of the company, or 
he can receive extra pay. Merit is also a legal principle, 
at least in the public sector, in which job candidates must 
be selected on the basis of merit. For our purpose, in ex-
amining the concept of second-order recognition, we can 
understand a valuable practice as follows:
c1) A practice that provides emotional support and 
recognition (such a practice would be very similar to the 
process discussed under B1). Here too, legal rights can 
be used to recognize a specific way of loving and caring 
practiced in a minority group. The differences here are as 
follows:
a) There are other forms of showing esteem, such as 
symbolic politics, which are similar to the verbal 
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commendation described before. Here, we might 
publicly value the method of loving and caring that 
is used in the minority group. This public recognition 
could mean, for example, pointing out the merit of al-
ternative forms of caring found in larger communities, 
tribes, homosexual partnerships, or other collective 
units. Again, the main society need not indicate that it 
wishes to copy or imitate the practice in question. As 
we have observed before, this type of symbolic poli-
tics is not only an ideological superstructure, it is also 
the basis on which individuals can develop a positive 
sense of self-relation, as their practices are interpre-
ted as valuable not only directly by the members of 
the cultural group but also indirectly as practices of 
recognition within the broader society. We could also 
similarly conceptualize a material form of recognition 
in which esteem for alternative forms of emotional 
support leads to economic redistribution.
b) The reason for the type of esteem for emotional 
support is quite different from the reason for cog-
nitive respect for the same support. Whereas in 
the first case, the reason for esteem is the specific 
merit of the unique form of organizing emotional 
support, in the case of legal support, the argument 
is about equality: for every individual and group 
to be able to organize emotional support equally, 
some cultural groups need specific protection for 
their practices.
c2) A legal practice that assures equal recognition. Again, 
instead of legally protecting group laws or internal regulations, 
we can also honor them for their specific contribution. This act 
might include financial support, legal support, or “only” sym-
bolic support for the legal structure of the cultural group.
c3) A practice that expresses esteem for members of 
the same cultural group. Clearly, we can also legally, sym-
bolically, or economically “honor” the practice of distribut-
ing esteem between members of a group.
In all cases in group C, we show esteem for a particu-
lar contribution, a particular solution within a group to the 
general problems of distributing love, respect, and esteem. 
When we show (second-order) esteem for a specific con-
tribution of a cultural group, we recognize the merit of the 
alternative cultural practice not only for the group itself but 
also for the rest of society. A practice by a cultural minor-
ity has merit for the whole society because it presents an 
alternative mode of behavior/social organization and there-
fore broadens the possibilities for all individuals within the 
society. In other words, the mere existence of alternative 
forms of differentiated (first-order) recognition is valuable 
to the whole society because it provides greater liberty for 
all of its members. In all three cases, the main society, its 
institutions, and its individuals are implicated as recogniz-
ing actors in the process. 
The following table summarizes the concept of second-
order recognition in the nine possible modes.
Table 3. 
Modes of second-order recognition
second-order recognition
Emotional support Cognitive respect Social esteem
First-order emotional support 1. Emotional support for any form of 
first-order recognition cannot be conver-
ted into a normative obligation.
2. Emotional support for any form of 
first-order recognition should not be 
converted into a normative obligation.
3. Any form of first-order recognition 
does not require emotional support from 
outside.
e.g., Legal support for traditional forms 
of caring
e.g., Symbolic and material recognition 
(i.e., through redistribution) for tradi-
tional caring practices because of the 
specific contribution of this culture
First-order cognitive respect e.g., Legal support for a community-
based legal structure
e.g., Symbolic and material recognition 
(i.e., through redistribution) for limited 
self-government
First-order social esteem e.g., legal support for culturally specific 
modes of granting esteem (communi-
ties of values)
e.g., Symbolic and material recognition 
(i.e., through redistribution) for commu-
nity values.
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As we have observed, the concept of second-order rec-
ognition can be used as an analytical tool for understanding 
how mainstream society can relate to the specific practices 
of cultural minorities. If we understand cultural practices as 
practices of recognition, the main society can relate to these 
practices in a positive way, recognizing them in legal, sym-
bolic, or material terms. We have also observed that such 
recognition does not require an emotional response to these 
practices. Finally, we have been able to trace the limits of 
recognition. Where culturally specific practices interfere with 
the physical integrity, social integrity, or dignity of individual 
members, they should not be protected by second-order rec-
ognition. In other words, second-order recognition aims to 
combat individual suffering that stems from unjust social situ-
ations. In those cases where there is an increase of suffering 
and where there is first-order disrespect instead of first-order 
recognition, the second-order response to these practices 
must be rejection rather than recognition. What is more, the 
notion of second-order recognition can also be used to ad-
dress diversity within minority groups. In other words, minori-
ties within minorities, those that do not agree with some of 
the practices of the minority group as a whole, also require 
some form of second-order recognition to organize practices 
of (first-order) recognition among themselves.
The 3x3 matrix of theoretically possible ways of under-
standing second-order recognition (and the corresponding 
2x3 matrix of actual possibilities) also shows the entangle-
ment of the different types of recognition within multicul-
tural societies. It is impossible to neatly separate the three 
spheres of recognition, as all of the spheres require legal 
protection and need to be considered valuable so that they 
can be preserved and permit the individuals within them to 
develop a positive self-relation.
We now are able to see why I opted for the term second-
order recognition instead of others4 for describing this second-
order approach toward groups. I did so for two reasons: First, 
to state its inseparable link to (first-order) recognition. Second-
order recognition is not any kind of recognition of the major-
ity towards minority groups but only recognition that refers to 
the recognitional content of practices of first-order recognition. 
Second, I chose the term in order to underline its analytical 
similarity to two modes of recognition in the theory of Axel 
Honneth, namely cognitive respect and social esteem.
ConCluSionS
The concept of second-order recognition is a powerful tool 
for analyzing, understanding, and evaluating conflicts in 
multicultural societies. This concept allows conflicts within 
4  Pensky (2007, 2008), for example, speaks of “second-
order inclusión” when refering to transnational solidarity and 
group’s inclusion as well as deliberative justified exclusion.
groups that involve a struggle for first-order recognition to 
be distinguished from conflicts between cultural minorities 
and the main society that involve a struggle for second-or-
der recognition. Second-order recognition not only serves 
as a valid concept within social and political philosophy, it 
is also meant to be a genuine sociological concept. The 
scheme presented in Table 3 allows us to analyze real, 
existing practices of recognition and rejection of cultural 
groups. What is more, we can evaluate the claims to rec-
ognition made by minority groups. This classification will 
help us to understand what is at stake in each case of mul-
ticultural conflict.
Furthermore, second-order recognition has positive sec-
ondary effects, and understanding some conflicts in multi-
cultural societies in this manner can help us to foster these 
effects. First, a society that recognizes cultural minorities will 
be able to more easily generate positive self-relation due to 
the mutual character of recognition. The main society and its 
members are mirrored by their own cultural groups as a liber-
al or tolerant society and not as an oppressive one. Second, 
this process of struggling for second-order recognition leads 
to an increase in intergroup relations. on the one hand, mem-
bers of the main society try to understand the recognitional 
content of the practices of cultural minorities. on the other 
hand, minority groups, by conferring power to the main so-
ciety, are also recognizing it in a specific way. This increase 
in inter-group relations could lead to the merging of horizons. 
Third, by recognizing (i.e., positively evaluating) at least the 
recognitional content of specific practices, all members of a 
society become familiar with alternative ways of organizing 
first-order recognition. This increase in possibilities can be 
understood as an increase in freedom. Finally, although the 
recognition of differentiated practices has important effects on 
the identity of specific cultural groups, second-order recogni-
tion can also help to create a common (e.g., national) identity 
and can thus help to create solidarity between members and 
groups of the society as a whole (on the importance of the 
struggles themselves see also Tully 2000). 
However, there are still some questions that could in-
spire further research about the concept of second-order 
recognition. For example, one question relates to the inter-
nal diversity of cultural groups. What if certain members of 
the group seeking second-order recognition do not identify 
with the rules according to which the group organizes rec-
ognition? Is there no danger of reifying groups and group 
practices? We have already discussed some cases of 
clear first-order disrespect that should not be protected by 
second-order recognition. However, what happens if there 
is no clear response to the practices of first-order recogni-
tion and disrespect? What is the role of the main society in 
this internal struggle for recognition? Here, we might exam-
ine topics such as the opportunity for individuals of cultural 
groups to effect change within their own groups and the 
potential for individuals to leave their cultural groups.
RIS  [online] 2015, 73 (2), e008. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/ris.2013.07.21
12  . BENNo HERzog 
Another open question is whether the concept pre-
sented here is useful for all types of cultural minorities. As 
Emcke (2000) pointed out, there is an important difference 
between groups with chosen identities (e.g., Buddhists) 
and those with imposed ones (e.g., African Americans).
Further theoretical and sociological work must deter-
mine what types of social and individual pathologies are 
connected to the lack of second-order recognition (on 
pathologies see also zurn 2005). A lack of second-order 
recognition affects the opportunities for groups to organ-
ize first-order recognition, which can generate disrespect 
towards individuals. It could also be suggested that, as in 
dialogical processes of personal identity creation, the crea-
tion of group identity and the position of cultural groups 
within society depend on second-order recognition. The 
concept of second-order recognition is a promising means 
to understand conflicts and disrespect in multicultural soci-
eties and is worthy of further examination.
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